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A COMMUNITY OF PSYCHES: 
SANTAYANA ON SOCIETY 
by John Lachs 
Readers of Santayana know frustration and delight. T o  the literate 
among LIS, little gives greater joy than to be borne by a rich current of  
words to insights that burst on us like the morning light. Yet much in 
Santayana's fabric of thought dissatisfies. Some think him too poetic, 
others too deeply devoted to reason and to  science. Positivists find him 
too metaphysical, metaphysicians too positivistic. Stern moralists con- 
demn him for having embraced an aesthetic or  spiritual life; religious 
people bemoan that he is not spiritual enough. 
Perhaps one could explain these frustrations as due mainly to our 
natural hope to find in others what we think is right. But there are two 
areas of Santayana's thought where his readers' pain is too universal to 
explain away. One is in literary criticism, the other in his social and 
political views. How can Santayana both condemn Emerson and praise 
him? How can he celebrate Shakespeare and also consider him a bar- 
barian? And what does he really think about democracy? Which is the 
best form of government and the best community? How sho~tld the in- 
dividual relate to the laws and the state and the international order that  
may come someday? 
I will not discuss literary criticism here, although I think that what I 
will say about the source of our anger with Santayana over his political 
theories can also be applied in that area. I will develop Santayana's view 
of the relation of the individual to the community and do so in detail for 
two important reasons. The first is that there has been very little serious 
consideration of this part of his philosophy. More ~ignificantly, there is 
no problem more timely, more pressing, o r  more difficult than the pre- 
cise nature and proper form of this relationship. Confusion about it has 
become a hallmark of American society even while other nations assume 
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thoughtlessly that they have the right idea, I d o  not wish to flatter 
thought by saying that if only we had the inteIlectua1 answer, it would 
gain acceptance before long. But it is no  joyous task to go stumbling 
without sight. It may be  profitable to see more clearly about matters of 
such moment. 
Why does Santayana seem indecisive about the good society? How 
can he describe widely divergent social arrangements with equal sym- 
pathy, seeing the point of  each and refusing to condemn? H e  has been 
severely and perhaps unjustly criticized for his ready acceptance of fascist 
Italy. Yet he deplored his sister's love of fascist Spain, launched a sear- 
ing attack on imperial Germany, freely publicized his admiration of Bri- 
tain, and on occasion confessed a quiet love even for the imperfect 
democracy of the United States. I know no other thinker who could 
write equally eloquent defenses of a secular, cosmopolitan world order 
and of a society of fanatical monks. 
Are such broad sympathies due to a lack of principle? T o  the con- 
trary. They are the deliberate and adequate expression of Santayana's 
most deeply and sincerely held beliefs. For Santayana is a relativist con- 
cerning values and this naturally makes him a relativist about social 
arrangements. 
We should not be distressed at hearing the word "relativist." Many 
of those who believe that values are absolute and unchanging d o  so be- 
cause they think of them as relative to or  dependent on the will of God. 
Relativism has received a bad name because Protagoras and selected 
undergraduates maintain that good and evil are created by what they o r  
anyone thinks. This exalts the power of thought less than it insults the 
significance of evil and leads to a number of silly consequences. It is not 
the sort of relativism Santayana has in mind. He  thinks values are 
relative to the established nature of individuals. 
If we now ask "Why individuals?" we suddenly find ourselves at the 
level of Santayana's deepest metaphysical commitments. For he is con- 
vinced that value links up with desire, living tendency, and action, and 
he sees the individual as the only center and source of agency. Of course, 
the individual is not ,  for Santayana, some disembodied soul or  amphi- 
bious person. All motion is in the end physical, and the meanings that 
convert motion into action are themselves the products of consciousness, 
which is physically based. The individual, then, is primarily a biological 
organism, an animal fighting for life and love in a violent world. 
Attentive reading of Santayana reveals that the generative image in 
his mind is that of the single animal attempting by cunning and force to 
thrive or  at least to survive. The world of space and time is a field of ac- 
tion, and substance, he says, is universal food. The best evidence for the 
unity and continuity of nature is the symmetry of action: all agencies are 
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capable of  affecting each other, of aiding or impeding each other's ac- 
tivity. The final reality, then, is to eat or  to be eaten, to prevail or to  be 
annulled. 
This ultimate rule of existence is converted into value with the emer- 
gence of special, self-maintaining vortices in the flux, These organisms, 
each a controlled and complex set of  habits, have the capability of  
sustaining and restoring their activity. They are  enduring, definite beings 
for whose perpetuation not all contingencies are  equally welcome. It is 
the definite constitution, the established potentialities, the living 
momentum of organisms that ground value; all creatures seek and avoid, 
embrace o r  abhor  on  the basis of who they are and in what they are 
engaged. 
Humans are no different from other organisms in this respect. Their 
habits may cover a broader range, they may be more adaptive or more 
unstable. But in the last analysis each individual human being is just such 
a center of selectivity and agency. This swirling center of activity is what 
Santayana calls the "psyche"; it is simply the individual as a totality of 
dynamic tendencies. The unity of  the psyche is, Santayana readily ad- 
mits, mythological: it exists only for the observer who wishes to think of 
immensely complex affairs without having to focus o n  each complexity. 
In reality, the psyche is a moving spatio-temporal region that displays a 
staggering variety of loosely coordinated activities. I see a confirmation 
of this every time my toenail grows while I think of God.  
In this conception of the soul or psyche, as in many other of his 
philosophical ideas, Santayana draws heavily on Aristotle. The insistence 
on activity, the language of  potentiality (even of first and second act!), 
the ultimate unity of source of  the vegetative, conative, and cognitive 
functions all remind us of Aristotle. There is one  important difference. 
AristotIe thinks that the individual is a substance that engages in activi- 
ties. Santayana, by contrast, maintains that the psyche is simply the sum 
total of its activities. If we insist on using the language o f  substance- 
and Santayana is by n o  means reluctant to d o  so-only the entirety of  
the field of action, the sum total of the physical world, is a substance. 
The psyche is a mode of matter. 
But this last claim, while true, is seriously misleading. For although 
the psyche is a mode of the physical world, in another and very impor- 
tant respect it is a substance. Thoughts and values are modifications of 
this mode; with respect to them, the psyche functions as source and sub- 
stratum. This means that the individual is a moral substance; it is the ul- 
timate and only creator of the goodness of whatever is good and of the 
evil of what it abhors. 
I find no significant argumentation in Santayana's works in support 
of this position. Perhaps this is not altogether surprising. For activity, 
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desire, and consciousness are primary conditions of value-creation. What 
beings other than individuals can display these properties? Surely not 
atoms or molecules. The only other candidate is some larger unity, such 
as the state, The Hegelians made much of this, but throughout the long 
years of Santayana's productive life, Hegel was thoroughly discredited. 
Santayana simply did not think it necessary to argue for a position that 
seemed to him as obvious as the moral ultimacy of the individual. 
It is not difficult, however, to reconstruct the sorts of considerations 
that would have seemed persuasive t o  Santayana, had he bothered to ar-  
ray them and to develop them in detail. First of all, there is nothing in 
the state or  society that could be read as a valid analogue of desire or  
consciousness. Collections of individuals simply lack the unity and the 
biological sensitivity necessary for awareness. Unless one defines 
consciousness in some excessiveIy abstract metaphysical way-such as 
multiplicity-in-unity, in which case every modulated belch would have its 
attendant cognition-society lacks the organ for awareness and we lack 
all reasonable evidence for supposing that there is anything beyond 
individual perceptions and thoughts. As to desire, all we can detect in 
communities is the contagion of seeking and of wants. There is no  
indication of an added immediacy, of an experience of communal desire 
in some social mind. 
Second, we note that each "action" of every community is in fact 
an action performed by individuals on  its behalf. T o  say that on Decem- 
ber 7, 1941, Japan attacked the United States is shorthand for what a 
number of sailors and pilots did at Pearl Harbor in the name of the Em- 
peror. T o  be sure, there are many things individuals would not d o  if they 
were not in the company of others, or if they did not think that what 
they propose is sanctioned or  required by the rules that unite them. But 
this constitutes no evidence of agencies more cosmic than ordinary mor- 
tals. Whatever is done must be performed by men and women singly or in 
groups. It is just that one among the factors determining their will may be 
their perception of what the state or their community demands. 
Let me say at once that this analysis appears to be correct. T o  main- 
tain that Japan attacked the United States by rneans of its sailors and 
airmen, just as I scratch my nose with my fingers and thumb, is t o  lose 
sight of a critical condition of agency. Players in the field must be able 
to be found. There is n o  problem in locating me or my fingers. It is not 
unreasonable, therefore, to say that my fingers were not the ultimate 
source o f  agency when they wandered to relieve an itch. But in spite of  
the fervent testimony of sociologists that institutions are real, who has 
ever encountered a state? Is there more to General Motors than the pat- 
terned activities and possible activities of a large number of people? T o  
explain the supposed efficacy of states, we need have reference to noth- 
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ing beyond what physical individuals do in the  physical world and what 
meanings they perceive or  what rules they find compelling. 
I am not, of course, denying that institutions are in some sense real. 
But the task of the philosopher does not end-in fact it only begins- 
with this acknowledgment. For reality comes in many forms and i t  is a 
disastrous error to identify all of them with power. Mathematical rela- 
tions are real, yet it would be silly to think that they bend the mind t o  
compel recognition. Physical laws are real, but the law of gravity would 
never keep me tethered on the ground. The joy of sun that lingers into 
evening is real and beautiful and rare. But it is the rich expression of a 
healthy life, not the force that makes us carry on.  The philosophical task 
is not t o  distinguish appearance from reality or  truth from illusion. T o  
d o  justice to the complexity of the world, we must sort out and learn to 
appreciate the different kinds of reality that surround us. Santayana 
undertakes this mission in a clear-headed and resolute way that could 
serve as a model for all of us. He  sees the claim and place of every sort 
of  being; concerning reality he is the greatest pluralist. 
Our culture, interested in power without responsibility, is insensibly 
turning Hegelian. We see power everywhere and want to exercise our  
own namelessly, as though it were a part of the nature of things and 
hence could never be called into account. PeopIe now widely subscribe t o  
the fiction that true agency, and therefore responsibility, resides in insti- 
tutions or "the system." As a result, we readily blame government, big 
business, or the oil companies, while we insist that in our role as em- 
ployees of these institutions we must not be  blamed. If ever there was an  
inverted moral order, we live it: we say the fictive system does it all, 
while the true agents hide behind their roles o r  seek innocence through 
committees and the collective act. Santayana saw the early stages of this 
trend and recognized it as a sad inversign. I t  is time for us to unmask it 
and to take corrective steps. The trouble with our  society is not that we 
are excessively individualistic, but that we are not individualistic enough. 
For the individual as single agent carries knowledge of his acts, or a t  
least responsibility for their consequences. Only such persons can con- 
stitute a community, a human world that is not a mere social machine. 
Santayana's view that values are relative to  psyches and his convic- 
tion that individuals are ontologica1ly ultimate in the social world should 
give us at least the beginnings of an understanding of why he appears to 
be elusive about the good society. For, to him, no society is good simply 
because of its structures or  processes. Such formal features promote the 
possibility of certain perfections, but all perfections presuppose underly- 
ing natural organisms. The value of a community, therefore, is largely a 
function of the nature of its constituent psyches. Since human nature is 
neither stable nor uniform, psyches can differ widely, though not inde- 
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finitely, within changing parameters. As a result, a society that permits 
ideal self-expression to one sort of psyche may be the paradigm of evil to 
another type. There is no one good or best society, because there are 
many good ones, each best for a certain type of soul. 
Let me now develop Santayana's criteria for the goodness o f  com- 
munities in somewhat greater detail and more systematically than he did. 
His central and most general idea here, once again, has Aristotelian over- 
tones. Psyches have definite potentialities, By and large, it is these poten- 
tialities that determine what the psyche desires and what in fact would 
satisfy it,  The notion of the good life is thus the notion of discharging what 
is latent in us. The good society, in turn, is that which enables or allows all 
or a very large number of its members to lead the good life. Given the 
essential interdependence of human beings, the community functions as a 
condition of individual self-fulfillment. 
The matter is, of course, not quite so  simple as this would suggest. 
For there are significant problems in determining the individual's good 
and there are nagging difficulties in the treatment of minority psyches. 
The individual soul is not ,  for the most part, a rationally or  even neatly 
structured unity. Long-term constitutive interests vie for dominance with 
stray impulses directed upon momentary but very real goods. None but 
the most impoverished psyche may hope for fulfillment by the satisfac- 
tion of all its desires; for those of us in whom life runs hot and thick, in- 
ternal strife is a daily spectacle. Hence we must distinguish the "real" 
from the "apparent'' good of every creature, and for someone with San- 
tayana's sensitivity for the reality even of the apparent, this can be done 
only in terms o f  the contrast between narrow short-range and richer 
long-range goods. The good life for an individual, then, is one in which 
he or  she is able to satisfy the richest set of most intense desires or attain 
the largest number of fervently sought compossible goods. 
The interest in this harmonious maximization is what Santayana 
caIls "reason." T o  be sure, there is nothing compulsory about reason or 
uniform about its products. Those in whom the impulse for harmony is 
weak may live and die, as did Aristippus, in a golden haze. We can say 
of them perhaps that they had a good time, but not that it amounted to 
a satisfying life. There is no  legitimate moral criticism of those who opt 
against reason, so long as we are not asked to  bear the cost o f  their 
choice. Fortunately, of course, we would not have to criticize for long, in 
any case: those who steadfastly reject maximization have no reason to  
embrace the life-enhancing and soon expire of a passing passion. 
That reason is uniformly the impulse for harmony may mislead us 
into supposing that it yields uniform results. But maximization is a for- 
mal principle. It orders our desires without determining what they shall 
be and without creating new ones, which, in some abstract way, it might 
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be better to fulfill or  to possess. Reason, like married love, works with 
what there is. It was reason that shaped the life of Casanova no Iess than 
it rules the latest pope. Achilles and the Ayatollah abide by it to varying 
degrees; in each it is the gardener that trims natural growths. The man 
of reason who leads the good life, therefore, is not limited to any one 
kind of man. It is anyone who brings unity to his soul, no  matter what 
flowers his native soil may grow. 
This discussion of reason and the  good life gives us the clue to  a 
fuller development of Santayana7s view of social authority and the pro- 
per treatment of divergent psyches. Ideally, the good society facilitates 
the fulfillment of all its constituent psyches, Such social harmony has 
been a human ideal since Plato's time o r  before. But, once again, it 
would be a mistake t o  be rigid about the specific features of such a socie- 
ty. It may operate by inflexible rules and demand unconditional self- 
sacrifice, if that is what its citizens expect and enjoy. It may, on the 
other hand, be an association of anarchic sybarites, each psyche a lovely 
note but the whole composing only a loose, uncertain melody. Santayana 
has n o  quarrel with the varieties of life, so long as they are authentic and 
fulfilling to  those who lead them. 
But such universal fulfillment is an ideal not only in the sense that it 
would be good to have. It is also beyond the pale of reality. Under the  
best of circumstances, some souls are left out; even in the bravest new 
world, deviants and malcontents abound. What will a good society d o  
about them? First of all, it will try to keep their number as low as possi- 
ble. And second, it will leave them as much room to fulfill themselves in 
their own way as it can without abandoning its grounding principles. 
Toleration, the maximal bending of rules consistent with the genius of a 
community, then, is a necessary feature of any good society. Let me 
stress at once that no  precise or  determinate amount of toleration is 
necessary. Different social organizations can and should permit differing 
magnitudes of dissent and deviance. Santayana's point is not that tolera- 
tion should be infinite, but that intolerance should not be unchecked and 
gratuitous. His condemnation of militancy is founded precisely on this 
point. For a militant society is less concerned with assuring the fulfill- 
ment of its faithful than with frustrating the will of everyone else. Mili- 
tancy always involves the effort t o  impose an alien will. This pursued on  
a small scale is Iamentable; when it becomes a way of social life, it 
always yields disaster. 
But why is a society of total toleration not better than a11 others? 
Because the very notion of such a community is a meaningless abstrac- 
tion. Human nature is so varied that the desires and operations of the 
people in a community are never completely compatible. Conflicts natur- 
ally arise, wills cross in the process of seeking private goods. Those who 
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think that we would grow like flowers without social rules, never had a 
garden to observe. Without rules, toleration would be restricted to the 
strong or crafty; everyone else would soon be oppressed or dead. Tolera- 
tion must, therefore, always remain a limited and relative matter, for 
from the standpoint of the leaders of a society there is no  difference be- 
tween tolerating intolerance and perpetrating it. 
Must we then suppose that militancy is unconditionally bad? This 
would at once destroy Santayana's moral relativism. And, I must admit, 
the deep respect I feel for individual autonomy inclines me to think- 
better, to feel-that imposing an  alien will by force is always evil. But 
the moment we reflect on the great militant spirits o f  history and view 
their actions from their own perspective, the pervasiveness of evil disap- 
pears. Attila and the Grand Inquisitor, Stalin and Savonarola all had a 
perfectly good time attacking o r  persecuting. But d o  not let me hang the 
matter on how they felt. Only an  external unsympathetic view can over- 
look the inner cogency and justification of the militant. We may call his 
reasons rationalizations, but from his own point of view they are valid 
and compelling. For the true enthusiast, militancy is not a pose; it is the 
only form in which his nature gains expression. T o  condemn him, we 
must compare his views with ours and find them wanting. Or we must be 
able to show that his nature is depraved or  worse than ours. Such com- 
parisons are not impossible. But they take place in the private imagina- 
tion, an  organ notoriously bathed in prejudice. They all presuppose stan- 
dards and perspectives that are far from neutral, so that their results 
become predictable. 
Militancy is, indeed, bad from the standpoint of the person over- 
whelmed. But it is the only form of life worth the effort for some vigor- 
ous wills. This is as far as argument can go; the rest is left to physical 
encounter. For moral-and political-arguments soon come to an end 
and we face each other with guns or at the ballot box. But preferably at 
the ballot box? Clearly-for you and me, today. But with guns if cir- 
cumstances change, if not to impose our will on others, then at least to 
prevent them from forcing theirs on us. 
The outbound militancy of a state is aggression; when directed in- 
ward, it becomes oppression. There are good societies, Santayana thinks, 
that are natively aggressive. They offer their citizens not balanced lives 
but glorious demise. But no good society is oppressive to any significant 
extent. For there is a subtle but important difference between not allow- 
ing people to d o  what they want and forcing them to d o  what we desire. 
The former is best done by such rules as the criminal law, the latter by 
force or ruthless terror. A good society, then, will try to make room for 
deviant psyches. If it comes to  the point where deviants must be con- 
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trolled, it will proscribe rather than prescribe, stop harmful behavior in- 
stead of twisting natures. 
What renders groups of people true communities is the kinship of 
their natures or their souls. I t  is not ,  of course, that communities are ac- 
cidents o f  nature. On the contrary, the native bent of  every society car- 
ries it to communion. We all tend to create replicas of ourselves in our 
children. The process of socialization reinforces our similarities. The 
power of a society in defining wants and channeling efforts, in creating 
desires and providing for their satisfaction, is unparalleled. The result is 
a staggering though largely unnoticed uniformity among the psyches that 
constitute a nation. In spite of individual differences, our habits and 
values are confined within modest parameters: Jones of Jonestown fame 
resembles a self-effacing U.S. hermit more than he resembles a mad  
Ayatollah. 
The similarity of psyches, once it is sensed, establishes the founda- 
tion of  legitimate authority in the state. Those who speak for alien goods 
receive no hearing in the soul. Authority has a vital basis: only when the 
voice of our own values calls are we impelled to action or sacrifice. Yet 
even this voice, spoken through the laws or government, is inadequate to  
integrate us into a community so long as we think we can d o  it all alone. 
Santayana is less eloquent on this point than many of the great pro- 
ponents of human unity. But he sees it clearly enough: to make a 
community, we must view each other a s  necessary friends. This means 
that each must regard the others as having legitimate claims to fulfill- 
ment, and his own welfare as organically tied to theirs. We must see the 
free self-expression of all, to rewrite Marx,  as a condition of the free self- 
expression of each. 
There are many ways in which political philosophies may fail. They 
have the usual difficulties attendant on description, generalization, and 
the avoidance of contradiction in complexity. But, in addition, they aIso 
face special problems associated with the fact that they have normative 
elements and stand, as does any theory about society, a good chance of 
being self-falsifying. In writing of values, Santayana is a devoted follower 
of Spinoza: he attempts to give a calm, descriptive account o f  human 
valuation, instead of telling us how everything should be. Yet we find 
that with the growth of the organic state, Santayana's claims about the 
primacy of the individual recede from the descriptive to the normative 
level. It is as if we found human history bent on convincing us that 
Hegei was right, after all, that ultimate agency resides in units much 
larger than the individual. Individual agency is now ever more difficult t o  
trace and personal responsibility is turned away; what used to be obvious 
fact must now be disentangled by analysis. In a world like this, San- 
tayana's claim that the community is built of single units, that its legi- 
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timacy derives from you and me, is more of a call to action than a true 
account. I agree with the call, but it is important to see how easily even a 
descriptive naturalist can find himself in the pulpit preaching of threaten- 
ed values to a yawning world. 
Political thought may be self-falsifying, as well. It would be easy to 
overstate the social impact of Santayana's thought; I certainly d o  not 
wish to d o  so. Yet i t  has made some small contribution to public knowl- 
edge of the cost of relativistic individualism. And this cost is high. A 
serious commitment to  the primacy of the individual puts choice and ac- 
countability on  our reluctant shoulders. And if we believe in the relativity 
of values, we rob ourselves of the joy of condemnation. Responsibility 
without solace is what we face if Santayana and his soul mates are cor- 
rect; is it surprising, then, that we do what we can to render their 
thoughts false? 
Yet these are  not the ultimate problems with Santayana's view. There 
is one issue that grows out of the essence of his project that presents a 
nagging, gaping failure. Santayana's attempt is to understand all without 
passing judgment. This cognitive ideal has been deeply embedded in 
philosophy. It was profoundly attractive to Santayana, who was by 
nature reflective, a spectator. But understanding is not the only function 
of thought; we cannot leave the physical world to  brute, untutored ac- 
tion. Santayana's own master, the great Peripatetic, taught that in addi- 
tion to the pure joys of intellectual life, there is also moral virtue guided 
by reason through sound habits and the practical syllogism. Here San- 
tayana has little to offer. There is understanding but no guidance for 
life. If anything, we understand s o  much that we d o  not know where to 
turn. The legitimacy of all styles calls our  own in doubt. 
Let me be clear about what I have in mind. Schopenhauer thought 
that all life was equally legitimate. H e  inevitably concluded that we must 
never impede the will of any other creature and hence should choose a 
course of  resignation and saintly death. Santayana refuses to draw even 
this conclusion. For the psyche, he thinks, is primed to live and act; even 
after, as philosophers, we understand, it is best to leave it t o  d o  its thing. 
But this presupposes that the potentiality of the psyche is fully formed 
and unchangeable. And it commits us to the view that thought either 
makes no difference or  can create no improvement. 
I think these assumptions are false. There is n o  better way to 
demonstrate the problem than by focusing on children. Every communi- 
ty's future is locked up  in its children and each wants to  control it 
through education. T o  parents, raising children is a world-creative act. 
Obviously, we cannot make our  chjldren into anything we want. But 
there are options, there are futures to consider, there are choices to  
make. In doing so  we seek, perhaps more than we ever sought for our- 
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selves, what is rational and good and satisfying. What shall we make of 
our  children? On what principle shall we choose the psyches with which 
we endow them for life? It is inadequate to say that we must do what 
our psyches now demand. For in such soul-making we transcend our 
ken, and as the future opens, our own values lose sacred primacy. 
I know that soon enough we learn how we shall have raised our 
children. But that is not to know how we should d o  or should have done 
it. In raising children the value of our own psyches and of our whole 
community is what needs to be questioned first of all. How shall we 
ground our judgment? Moral and political philosophy must have an 
answer. Santayana's, unfortunately, does not, 
